In the wake of a series of tragic events impacting public health in the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Homeland Security have attempted to facilitate information sharing across public health and homeland security organizations. Data collected as part of a national assessment of law enforcement and homeland security information sharing, funded by the National Institute of Justice, indicate such efforts to date have been helpful in establishing a foundation for information sharing, yet fall short of creating mechanisms by which tangible information sharing can occur. Recent initiatives to remedy this shortcoming are presented and recommendations for further success are discussed.
Homeland Security and Public Health: A Critical Integration
Terminology such as homeland security, intelligence-led policing, preparedness, and risk management have become consistent in the criminal justice lexicon in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 . As these policy applications continue to be conceptualized in the academic literature as well as in practice, the integration of the public health sector has just recently begun to emerge as the next supporting pillar in the preparedness structure. Recent initiatives primarily driven by the Department of Homeland Security and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have begun to outline the need to establish two-way communication channels and integrated policy initiatives between law enforcement and public health organizations in order to enhance threat prevention and preparedness efforts. Such initiatives have been absent from discussions in the criminal justice discipline. Indeed, policy and regulatory initiatives are being developed with virtually no research (or theoretical) foundation.
Mechanisms for gathering and sharing information 1 have been operationalized within both homeland security and public health. Despite such mechanisms being in place, there remains an information sharing disconnect between homeland security and public health. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of these initiatives, in order to assess and provide guidance to integrate public health and homeland security policies and capabilities. Data from a recent National Institute of Justice study on fusion center information sharing across the U.S. is presented here and illustrates an existence of such collaborations among stakeholders yet also a lack of tangible information sharing. This paper will provide an analysis of the types of information gathered for both homeland security and public health and how this information can be integrated together using the information fusion center approach.
Statement of Purpose
Since September 11, 2011 a significant amount of progress has been made to improve information collection and sharing in both the public health and homeland security sectors in their own rights. Approximately five years ago, both sectors recognized the importance of creating an information sharing capability that would connect one to the other. To date, there have been substantial efforts to successfully integrate public health information into homeland security prevention and preparedness efforts. In short, these efforts have established an operating environment in which both public health and homeland security have begun to develop working relationships, yet a lack of tangible information sharing remains. It is argued that efforts to improve information sharing under the guidance of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which has a different operational view of information sharing, have not be successful in integrating homeland security efforts. Recently, efforts guided by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security have provided actionable steps to integrate public health information. The present paper provides a legislative, regulatory and policy discussion followed by a national empirical assessment to illustrate the present information sharing environment among public health and homeland security. Recommendations for further operational success are provided. Areas for academic evaluation are identified.
A Note on Homeland Security
For purposes of this paper, the term "homeland security" refers to the capabilities of state and local law enforcement agencies, capabilities of state and major urban area fusion centers, as well as the integrated initiatives from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as their prevention and preparedness missions are related to public health threats. Specifically, the present DHS mission is centered on five core areas. Two of these areas pertain specifically to preventing terrorism and enhancing security as well as ensuring resilience to disasters (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2011a). It is within these two core mission areas which the importance of integrating public health information becomes critical to the success of DHS in accomplishing its mission. Methods of terrorist attack go beyond explosives to include biological agents and the natural spread of E.Coli is just one example of a public health disaster.
In order to successfully integrate this information into the homeland security decision making process, fusion centers will play a pivotal role.
While the DHS and state and local law enforcement are familiar to most in the criminal justice discipline, fusion centers are not as well understood. As it will be discussed, fusion centers are the focal point of current efforts to enhance public health prevention and preparedness (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011) . At the time of this paper, there are 72 officially recognized fusion centers in the United States (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011c). In brief, fusion centers operate as the information sharing lynchpin among all levels of law enforcement as well as the private and public sectors. Such a collaborative effort facilitates the sharing of threat-related information to law enforcement and client organizations (Cooney et al., 2011) . Masse and Rollins (2007) note that fusion centers represent a vital part of the nation's homeland security and are essential to fuse a broad range of data, including nontraditional sources of data, to create a more comprehensive threat picture for the prevention of terrorism.
This threat picture has broadened, largely a result of measures initiated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) which expanded fusion center missions from terrorism to include "all threats, all hazards" (Carter & Carter, 2009a Using a medical metaphor, fusion centers are the heart of the prevention and preparedness body for public safety. The public health sector represents a critical vein for moving epidemiological information to the fusion center where it can then be pumped back out to the prevention and preparedness limbs that are state and local law enforcement, critical infrastructure and public health organizations. The discussion to follow will expand on the types of information collected by fusion centers and public health and how this information can be fused together.
A Review of Homeland Security and Public Health Integration The Department of Homeland Security and Public Health
The role of public health in homeland security has recently evolved. Immediately following the events of 9/11, public health's primary role in homeland security was to assist in the detection of and preparedness for bio-terrorism attacks as set forth by President G. W. Bush's
Biodefense for the 21st Century (2004) . While these efforts have had measurable successes (Alexander, Larkin, & Wydia, 2006; Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 2007) and shortcomings (Spranger et al., 2007; Koh et al., 2008) , they established a foundation for Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 21 National Strategy for Public Health and Medical
Preparedness. HSPD 21 outlines a national policy for proactive preparedness for incidents impacting public health. This directive asserts such an approach is achievable by utilizing mechanisms of active information sharing across public health, public safety, and private business sectors. The effectiveness of this approach relies on the ability to translate best practices currently established in the arena of "all threats, all hazards" homeland security law enforcement to the operations of those in the public health discipline (The White House, 2007) .
In sum, HSPD 21 formally established the need to have different methods of "biosurveillance"
and "epidemiologic surveillance" as a means to maintain an active situational awareness of current public health trends and potential threats. The process of biosurveillance integrates active data gathering with analysis and interpretation of biosphere 2 data that might relate to disease activity and threats to human or animal health -whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or otherwise, and regardless of intentional or natural origin -in order to achieve early warning of health threats (Wagner et al., 2007) . Epidemiologic surveillance is the process of actively gathering and analyzing data related to human health and disease in a population in order to obtain early warning of human health events, rapid characterization of human disease events, and overall situational awareness of disease activity in the human population (Watkins et al., 2011) .
As the lead agency responsible for the prevention of and response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) attacks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acknowledged the need to not only have a system in place for responding to such public health-related tragedies, but also a means by which all public health-related threats could be monitored. As such, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) was created to serve as the DHS' principal authority for all medical and health issues (Department of Homeland Security, 2011c).
The operational arm with respect to monitoring public health threats and trends is the National Desired outcomes of such a capability include a threat being identified rapidly as well as a means to contain the spread of the event and reduce number of cases.
Efforts on behalf of both public health and homeland security have mirrored one another -both a positive and negative as these efforts progress. It is positive as both sides recognize and formally agree that information sharing for preparedness and prevention should exist between public health and homeland security. The negative impact of both sectors repeatedly agreeing that they should share information is that no progress is made towards actually achieving the desired outcomes. Actionable steps must be identified as a means to reach desired ends.
Identification of such steps remains difficult as initiatives to bridge public health and homeland security are plagued by a lack of systematic evaluation. While assessments of progress have been reported towards these goals have been reported (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011c; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011), there has been no empirical evaluation of success or return on investment.
State and Local Law Enforcement and Public Health
State and local law enforcement's role in public health has largely pertained to emergency response. While law enforcement has long served the role of "first-responder", their role in the current health threat environment can be traced to the anthrax incidents shortly after 9/11 (Butler et al., 2002; McHugh, Staiti & Feeland, 2004) , the 2003 spread of the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (Sarpy et al., 2005) , and more recently the H1N1 flu pandemic of 2009 (Macario et al., 2009) . Following the National Response Framework published by the Department of Homeland Security (2008), in the event of an emergency incident, local law enforcement serves as the initial response mechanism in a multi-layered response approach.
More specifically in event of a public health emergency, law enforcement is responsible for to quickly coordinate its response with public health and medical officials and, depending on the threat, enforce public health orders (e.g., quarantines or travel restrictions), secure the perimeter of contaminated areas, securing health care facilities, and investigating scenes of suspected biological terrorism (Richards et al., 2006) . In a large-scale incident, such as a pandemic, law enforcement resources are likely to become exhausted and law enforcement officials will have to balance their resources and efforts between these new responsibilities and everyday service demands. Moreover, within this multi-faceted responsibility of being first-responders to public health emergencies, it is plausible for law enforcement to be in a situation with a greatly diminished workforce, as officers and their families may become infected and ill, and some personnel may determine that the risk of continuing to report to work is just too great to themselves or their families (Richards et al., 2006) published a series of reports to help improve the law enforcement response to public health emergencies. In short, these reports emphasized the importance of law enforcement communication with public health organizations, other public safety agencies, and the community (Brito, Luna, & Sandberg, 2009a) and strategic planning for the prevention and mitigation of public health events such a pandemic flu (Brito, Luna, & Sandberg, 2009b; Sandberg et al., 2010) . Such communication is achieved through partnerships and liaison officer programs. Local law enforcement serves as a force-multiplier with respect to information collection. Primarily through community policing, police officers are able to gather raw information and recognize indicators and warnings of threats (Carter & Carter, 2009b ) -a somewhat "grass-roots" level of epidemiological surveillance. This micro-level information is critical to identifying accurate threat pictures and is relied upon by fusion centers and thus public health organizations as well.
An example of this approach can be found in Los Angeles, California where the Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG) serves as the focal point for analyzing the strategic and operational information needed to respond to a range of threats. The TWEG has two primary functions; 1) responsible for information sharing and intelligence fusion, and 2) performs net assessments to aid mission planning, decision-making, and allocation of resources in support of incident command during actual events (Sullivan, 2005) . More specifically, the TEWG… "…includes analysts from local, state and federal agencies to produce a range of intelligence products at all phases of response specifically tailored to the user's operational role and requirements…As part of this process, the TEWG seeks to identify emerging threats and provide early warning by integrating inputs and analysis from a multidisciplinary, interagency team. Toward this end, the TEWG has developed a local network of Terrorism Liaison Officers at law enforcement, fire, and health agencies, formed partnerships with the private sector to understand threats to critical infrastructure, and has developed and refined processes to analyze and synthesize threat data to support its client agencies" (Sullivan, 2005, p.1) .
Progress of Homeland Security and Public Health Integration since September 11, 2001
To begin, it is necessary to acknowledge the re-socialization process facing homeland security. This re-socialization impact is centered largely on state and local law enforcement. As contingency theorists would argue, September 11, 2001 created a dramatic shift of the environment in which law enforcement functions on a daily basis. This shift is primarily exhibited in the additional focus of law enforcement, which was traditionally limited to responding to incidents and calls for service, to -put it simply -create a level of situational awareness of potential threats in their jurisdictions (Burress, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010) . This shift in operational responsibilities, coupled with an emerging prevention and preparedness lexicon, has created a substantial learning curve for most state and local agencies.
Two recent reports have assessed the DHS' progress of implementing mechanisms to be preventative and prepared for a variety of threats in the 10 years since the attacks of 9/11. report went on to discuss that for the NBIC to obtain the resources it needs to meet its mission, it must "effectively employ collaborative practices, and we recommended that the NBIC work with its interagency advisory body to develop a strategy for addressing barriers to collaboration, such as the lack of clear mission, roles, and procedures, and to develop accountability mechanisms to monitor these efforts" (United States Government Accountability Office, 2011, p.69). In summation, while the NBIC appears to have organizational partners willing to share information, these partner agencies lack a common understanding of information sharing practices as well as the infrastructure to physically share information.
In sum, these reports have identified functional gaps of successfully sharing information between public health and homeland security. In response to these findings, both public health and homeland security must identify mechanisms that serve as information sharing conduits.
Systems for disseminating and receiving intelligence products must be created and public health must identify a means by which information can actively flow to and from public health organizations and incorporate a system by which this information is integrated into an analytic process.
Public Health Information Gathering and Sharing
Within the public health arena, biosurveillance describes the monitoring of characteristics (e.g. symptoms, lab results, or deaths within a population) for changes that could indicate an emerging threat -natural or deliberate. To date, most surveillance has not been in real time.
Rather, patient or community information is submitted to local health departments which are then reported in aggregate to state or federal health agencies. Such reporting techniques create detached information silos where information is typically stored vertically in disease-specified categories (e.g. H1N1 or HIV/AIDS) and those go largely unconnected (horizontal) to other, often inter-related, diseases or problems (Merrill et al., 2008) . These information silos are virtually the same that were experienced by both law enforcement intelligence and the intelligence community. Fusion centers are intended to be the remedy for sharing threat information -the same processes which must be applied to share public health threat information across sectors. Public health officials need to recognize this type of vertical organization hinders the ability of epidemiologists or analysts to fully assess the impact of diseases and conditions that affect public health. Moreover, the multiple public health surveillance systems that conduct surveillance are rarely capable of the data analysis needed to understand complex multidimensional problems. In short, these systems lack horizontal movement and simply "cannot talk to each other" (Danos & Hancock, 2009) .
In an effort to remedy this lack of horizontal communication among systems, new informatics solutions are emerging that reduce or eliminate these challenges by establishing effective silo system interoperability. A critical component of these new tools is a master person index that is used to link individuals across many disconnected data silo systems (Centers for While this approach may delay "real-time" sharing of certain information, it is well within the grasp of the law enforcement function. However, such an approach may prove to be difficult for personnel working for public health organizations as these individuals will likely lack the knowledge (or access to classified information) to establish either a criminal nexus or an articulable justification for sharing patient information with law enforcement in a proactive manner that is usually necessary to remain cognizant of natural and man-made threats.
Once again in the wake of the anthrax attacks of 2001 , SARS in 2003 , and H1N1 in 2009 rather than waiting for cases to appear, it became clear that identifying trends (or precursors) to these events would allow for earlier recognition of a possible epidemic or bioterrorism event. It became evident the system of surveillance was antiquated and slow; it wasn't capable of identifying the health risks until well after an attack had taken place (Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, 2011b). It was felt that public safety and public health data should be monitored on the local level as well as sent to a centralized repository for aggregation into larger geographic areas to detect a multi-site concurrent attack instead of the current silo mentality of looking at singular locals.
Public health utilized a case-counting method of information collection. Dimensions typically include who, what, where, when, how, and why. This case-counting process may be active or passive. Active processes are when cases are reported by health officials on a real-time basis -as they are identified. Passive processes are when health officials report case information on a scheduled basis -perhaps once a month. With respect to identifying threats, active processes are necessary as information pertinent to the threat must be identified in order to properly respond and/or prevent on-going threats. At present, passive surveillance is the predominant way case information is reported to public health officials. This is a hindrance to threat prevention and preparedness as this information may be shared too late to identify appropriate responses. The quality of this passive method of reporting depends on the actions of physicians, hospitals, and laboratories to identify and promptly report a case of importance or a positive laboratory result that suggests the presence of an important case (e.g. disease) -also referred to as notifiable diseases.
A host of laws and regulations dictate which diseases are notifiable to public health agencies, the method of submitting these reports, and the information required in the report.
Further complicating this information sharing effort is that these laws lack uniformity and vary among cities, regions, states, and countries (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011c).
Compliance with these reporting requirements also varies, but is frequently inadequate to meet the disease surveillance requirements facing today's public health leaders. This is because the current, paper-based passive reporting systems rely on a person (physician, nurse, administrator, laboratory technician, etc.) to submit the reports to public health officials. Unfortunately, public health reporting is too often delayed, incomplete, or even forgotten because of the competing priorities facing today's healthcare workforce (Barr et al., 2011) .
In contrast, active surveillance differs from passive surveillance by the methods used by health officials to identify new cases rather than predetermined notifiable diseases. This is typically achieved by assigning public health staff to medical facilities to review medical files to identify new cases (Olson, 2007) . Unlike passive surveillance systems, active surveillance reporting is typically timely, complete, and inclusive; however the majority of public health agencies lack the resources to conduct comprehensive active surveillance of health-related threats (Morrow & Novick, 2005) . Effectiveness of active surveillance systems are determined based upon their sensitivity and specificity. A high sensitivity surveillance system is one that rapidly identifies all cases and all potential cases of a disease whereas a high specificity system is one that correctly and uniquely identify cases of disease under surveillance. Accuracy of case reports in highly specific surveillance systems sacrifice speed of reporting while sensitive systems report faster, but lack accuracy. A specific and passive surveillance system may provide a useful estimate of the burden of a disease in a population over time, yet such a system is likely to be inadequate in its ability to predictor current disease trends, especially when trend changes occur rapidly (Barr et al., 2011) . The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic illustrated the shortcomings of traditional passive surveillance systems as health organizations struggled to identify cases in real-time so that prevention measures could be implemented in an efficient manner to reduce the impact of disease in the community (Barr et al., 2011) . This shortcoming is commonly attributed to delays in reporting on behalf of medical personnel and a failure to report all cases of a given threat.
With the implementation of new technologies and the movement towards electronic medical records, is appears to be likely that public health surveillance system automation will transform data collection, data analysis, and data reporting -thus resulting in dramatic increases in surveillance system sensitivity and specificity (Danos & Hancock, 2009 ). Such automation is likely to increase system sensitivity by rapidly identifying all potential cases that are entered into an electronic medical records system and then securely transmitting these cases to the appropriate public health agency. Simultaneously, specificity should increase with the adoption of person-matching and database analysis software tools that prevent duplication and falsepositive reports (Danos & Hancock, 2009 with state, local, and tribal public officials through a near real-time electronic nationwide public health situational awareness capability. Increases in the sensitivity and specificity of surveillance systems are designed to create a situational awareness system. Conceptually, situational awareness systems are designed to better understand when a public health threat is growing or decreasing, whether it is expanding into different geographic areas, and whether the threat is becoming more or less serious to the community or population (Hsu et al., 2010) . This situational awareness information is the critical type of public health threat information that needs to be shared with the homeland security sector. However as it will be illustrated and discussed in subsequent sections, this is not occurring.
Situational awareness is utilized to inform decision makers in the event of a looming threat to public health. Such decisions could include from deployment of additional resources to respond to the threat, implementing plans to provide mass vaccinations or treatments, and determinations of the movement of people within a community (e.g. school closings or quarantine areas). The key to successful situational awareness is the integration of disparate information sources. As it has been discussed, traditional information has included casecounting and medical chart reading. Situational awareness is most comprehensive when nontraditional sources of data are included to better inform the threat picture. For example a school liaison information officer may provide information on an unusual number of children absent.
This information can be integrated with local hospital/clinic information, pharmaceutical sales, or children absenteeism from a neighboring school. Lastly, disparate sources of information should be disseminated using standardized, or common, terminology. As a variety of medical- 
A National Snapshot of Information Sharing among Public Health and Homeland Security
The present study utilizes a unique national data set funded by the National Institute of Justice to "take the pulse" of current public health and homeland security information sharing.
No statistical inferences are made from the data. The intent of this paper is to illustrate the current public health and homeland security threat preparedness and prevention environment in the wake of initiatives to this point. As such, the data to follow will illustrate proportions of the state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and fusion centers sampled from across the United Sates and their information sharing relationships with members of the public health community. Such efforts are still in the infant stages of becoming operational; both public health and homeland security are "finding their way" in attempts to become interoperable with one
another. An empirical evaluation of such efforts would simply be premature. The data presented here provides a snapshot of current information sharing among public health and both law enforcement and fusion center personnel.
Methods
Data for the present study were collected as part of the Understanding the Intelligence
Practices of State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies grant funded by the National
Institute of Justice 7 . The survey, a self-administered questionnaire completed through a webdesigned survey provider and targeted two groups of key informants through a purposive sample. These low response rates were surprising. In order to clarify why the response rate was not higher, follow up telephone interviews were conducted with 100 randomly selected participants. Comments these individual provided, along with comments addressees emailed when they declined to participate, cited the following reasons when they chose not to respond:
1. Job responsibilities. Some individuals questioned whether their responses would be valid since they did not believe intelligence work was their primary role. This issue was also exacerbated by staff that previously served as intelligence workers, but had switched positions and no longer felt qualified to speak about intelligence issues.
2. The survey length. In order to fully explore the nature of and challenges to law enforcement intelligence work the survey instrument included 125 questions. Feedback suggests individuals were uncomfortable committing to this task, especially when they were at work. As one informant remarked, "Thirty minutes is too long, there's no way I have time to take a survey for half an hour -we're under massive pressure as it is." 3. One response per agency. Several individuals declined because they knew a colleague from the same agency had already responded. One person even indicated his work group had instituted an informal policy whereby they only respond to one survey per week and this task is rotated around the group. While it is possible to control for a limited number of responses when departments are small, it becomes problematic in the case of larger organizations and fusion centers.
4. Security. A handful of individuals were concerned about the security implications of sharing information about intelligence activities outside of the law enforcement community. This was a surprising finding since the study aims to inform public policy by identifying general, not agency specific, trends about law enforcement intelligence work. However, even with the backing of the U.S. Department of Justice, there was skepticism about the legitimacy of the data collection exercise.
Despite a somewhat low response rate and given the reasons listed above, the data remains very unique and at the time of this paper, is the only national quantitative survey of fusion centers. To date, there has been little research on fusion centers in general and of the available research, the methodologies employed consist largely of personnel interview data (Fresenko, 2010; Graphia-Joyal, 2010 , Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010 , analysis of government or public reports (Harper, 2009; Saari, 2010) , interviews of non-fusion center law enforcement (MacGregor, 2010) , and quantitative analyses of information sharing practices of a single state fusion center (Nennema, 2008; Cooney, Rojek, and Kaminski, 2011) .
Sample Demographics
National dispersion of responses was based on the 10 Federal Protective Service Homeland Security Regions 9 . It is suspected that due to federal involvement in information sharing initiatives, respondents working for fusion centers based in Region 3 10 provided the most (21.6%) responses followed by Region 9 11 (20.4%). The fewest responses (3.4%) came from Region 1 12 . Most fusion center personnel (48.0%) had held their position for between one and three years, in marked contrast to law enforcement workers (21.8%) who tended remain in the same role for more than ten years. Lastly, most of the respondents from both the fusion center sample (57.5%) and law enforcement sample (30.3%) indicated serving an administrative role.
Supervisors also consisted of a large portion (29.3%) of the law enforcement respondents.
Results
As working relationships among agencies and the sharing of analytic products has been found to be predictive of successful information sharing practices among state and local law enforcement (Carter, 2011) , the two critical areas to explore with respect to the current discussion are working relationships and the sharing of intelligence products among key stakeholders. Public health stakeholders include hospitals, public health agencies, public health officials, and state health departments. Results of the two data samples are provided consistent with this approach. Table 1 illustrates working relationships among public health stakeholders and different personnel in both the law enforcement and fusion center samples.
[ Table 1 approximately here ]
The sharing of actionable intelligence -the desired outcome of the information sharing initiatives described throughout this paper -rely largely on the efforts of intelligence analysts.
As can be seen in Table 1 , the majority of analysts in both fusion centers and law enforcement believe their working relationships with public health stakeholders is at best somewhat close and in much of the case, distant or non-existent. Intuitively, analysts are not very satisfied with these relationships. On the whole, fusion center personnel reported overall more positive working relationships with public health compared to law enforcement personnel. Again this is intuitive (and a good sign) as fusion centers are the primary entities tasked with the responsibility of developing and maintaining active relationships with the public health community. While clearly relationships among public health and law enforcement do exist, they are a far cry from being as close as one would expect to facilitate successful information sharing.
More direct indicators of the extent to which public health and homeland security are engaged in information sharing is the frequency by which they share information with one another, conduct sector-specific analysis, and have access to sector-specific information. Table 2 illustrates these indicators. On average, both law enforcement (78.2%) and fusion center (79.8%) personnel indicated they either infrequently or very infrequently provide intelligence to hospitals in their jurisdiction. These percentages are consistent with law enforcement's (78.7%) infrequently or very infrequently sharing of actionable intelligence to public health agencies and the state health department (79.8%) in their jurisdictions. An increase in the sharing of actionable intelligence with both public health agencies and state health departments was indicated by fusion center personnel as compared to the frequencies reported with respect to hospitals.
[ Table 2 approximately here ]
With regard to information access, only 18.8% of law enforcement agencies that employed either a full-or part-time intelligence analyst indicated their analyst had access to public health information as compared to 41.7% of fusion center personnel indicated analysts had access to this source of information. Again, it is expected that law enforcement in general will have less of an analytic capability compared to fusion centers as fusion centers primary function is to analyze disparate information from a variety of sources. Lastly, respondents in both samples were asked to indicate the frequency by which they conducted a variety of analytic techniques. Again, it is expected that law enforcement personnel (41.5%) conduct such analyses less often as compared to fusion centers (72.5%). However, it is worth noting that while the majority of fusion centers responded to having the capability to conduct health trend analysis, approximately one in every four of the fusion centers in the sample does not engage in this method of analysis. However, it is worth noting that 75.1% of the fusion centers indicating they did not engage in public health trend analysis also indicated they did not have access to public health information. While the data presented here is limited in detail, it does provide a glimpse of what is currently happening in the homeland security arena with respect to public health prevention and preparedness efforts. Implications of these insights will be discussed.
General observations from the data presented here indicate an existence of working relationships among public health stakeholders and law enforcement and fusion center personnel.
Despite such relationships, there is a considerable gap with regard to tangible information sharing. Based on this data, it can be assumed there is significant room for improvement in these prevention and preparedness efforts.
Current Initiatives to Integrate Homeland Security and Public Health
As the data presented above illustrate, there is a lack of tangible cooperation among fusion centers, state and local law enforcement, and public health. Recognizing this gap, the programs, and analyze aggregated interpreted data (information) from existing surveillance systems in order to enhance agency-wide situational awareness both domestically and globally" (Rolka, O'Conner & Walker, 2008, p.3) . While BioPHusion is a robust source of information -a combination of 42 different biological related information systems -it lacks tangible information sharing components necessary to deliver its intended output. Worth noting, the model is designed to serve as a raw information collector and lacks the ability to identify intelligence requirements (e.g. desired information based on a given situation), incorporate micro-level information, establish horizontal information sharing partnerships, and employ an analytic process that yields an actionable result (Rolka, O'Conner, & Walker, 2008) .
Second, the DHS created the Health Security Intelligence Enterprise (HSIE) to facilitate cooperation among public health and healthcare community (PH/HC) interests into the processes of homeland security information and intelligence exchange. The establishment of an institutionalized health security information and intelligence sharing framework is designed to enhance the preparedness level of PH/HC practitioners across the country, while supporting the all-hazards approach to prevention, protection, response and recovery efforts of homeland security stakeholders (Riegle, 2009 
Discussion and Conclusions
In sum, there remains an information sharing disconnect between public health and the entities tasked with homeland security preparedness. The data presented sheds light on the commonly held assumption that public health and homeland security are working together.
While it appears willingness for such an effort exists, the data show a consistent lack of tangible information sharing among the two sectors. It is hypothesized that this disconnect can be traced back to the authority outlined in HSPD 21 in that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was identified as the primary entity for creating an interoperable environment among all stakeholders. The underlying difficulty in this approach is that HHS' experience with information sharing up until this point has been one of vertical silo storage by disease category for aggregate assessment -not the sharing of disparate sources of information across different organizations on a real-time basis. Furthermore, public health sectors have suffered from decreasing resources as well and may find it difficult to realign personnel and infrastructure to support a homeland security function. While the authority for leading the collaboration among all stakeholders legislatively remain with HHS, the initiatives currently underway have -from an operational perspective -transferred primary responsibility to the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and state and regional fusion centers who have an established culture of preparedness-based information sharing.
Perhaps the most significant barrier facing these efforts is the inability of public health information to achieve a necessary balance of specificity and sensitivity in the information that is collected. It is believed that with the integration of public health information into state and regional fusion centers it is likely to yield a collective increase in the sensitivity and specificity of identifying threats to public health and homeland security. An improvement in this effort is likely to occur as fusion centers provide a mechanism to increase both specificity and sensitivity since the amount of information available to both public health and homeland security is multiplied in combination with a homeland security infrastructure designed to share information in real-time.
Furthermore, these interoperable efforts on behalf of both public health and homeland security can be enhanced through emerging health liaison officer programs. programs are e-mail and personal contact. Fusion center personnel included in the data presented in this paper indicated e-mail and personal contact were the two most commonly used mechanisms for distributing intelligence products. By establishing health officer liaison programs, public health entities can increase both the amount and quality of information they disseminate and receive. Such an effort is likely to improve a more sensitive, specific, and realtime information sharing capability among public health and law enforcement personnel -thus improving preparedness efforts.
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Notes
1. A clarification on information versus intelligence is necessary as the two terms are commonly used interchangeably -which is incorrect. Information refers to raw pieces of information -or simply the facts. Intelligence refers to information or facts that have gone through some form of an analytic process to yield an actionable result. For purposes of information sharing within the public health sector and in many cases the state and local law enforcement sector, the sharing of information is paramount -not intelligence per se. 2. Biosphere refers to the earth's crust, waters, and atmosphere that support life and is the ecosystem comprising the entire earth and the living organisms that inhabit it. 3. Patient information refers to all information about the patient -including name, medical record number, condition, sex, age, physician name, diagnosis, medical unit, other treatment information, and simply the fact that the individual is being treated within a medical facility (The University of Chicago, 2007). 4. Law enforcement requests for patient information require law enforcement personnel to fill out patient information request forms that include fields to verify personnel and provide justification for such information. Examples of these forms can be found at: http://hipaa.bsd.uchicago.edu/Law_Enforce_CPDform.pdf and http://www.orpdmp.com/orpdmpfiles/PDF_Files/LE%20Info%20Request_v1.0. 
